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Abstract 
 
Using examples from environmentally sensitive industries, the paper examines the 
determinants of corporate social disclosure (CSD). The paper moves beyond the 
traditional literature in two respects. First it is international in scope, examining the 
accounting disclosure responses of multi-national companies to the pressures implied 
by the nature and scope of their operations. Second, variables measuring political risk 
and social development are developed so that these pressures can be measured, 
thereby introducing new dimensions to the literature. In common with previous 
studies, financial risk, size and other control variables are included. The relationships 
are tested econometrically utilising regression techniques not previously applied in the 
CSD literature but nonetheless more generally appropriate when using count 
dependent variables. Results suggest that managers feel an unequal sense of 
responsibility to different constituencies and their disclosure priorities are determined 
by stock market accountability, lobbying power of their domestic audience and the 
political risk of their activities rather than the impact of their activities in countries of 
operation.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
Why do large multi-national firms make corporate social disclosures (CSDs) in their 
annual reports? Two possible hypotheses are explored in this paper. First the ‘benign’ 
managerialist hypothesis that the firms are essentially enlightened oligarchies, which 
recognise their social and environmental impact and their associated responsibilities 
and make appropriate disclosures. At the centre of this argument is the notion that 
CSD is arises from an ethical code which is espoused by the senior management of 
the firm and is transmitted ‘top down’ as a matter of policy. If the benign hypothesis 
were true, it would be expected that the CSD response would be proportionate to the 
international scope of the firm’s activities. An alternative second hypothesis is that 
firms have no such ethical code and that managers merely respond to market, social 
and political pressures when making CSDs. According to this hypothesis, CSDs 
reflect differential political, regulatory and lobbying power in different countries. 
Where these powers are the strongest, the firm makes greater CSDs in response, 
notwithstanding the objective level of environmental impact in that country. Where 
powers are weaker, for example in unstable and underdeveloped countries the firm 
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faces less direct pressure to make CSDs. Actual disclosures may in these 
circumstances be aimed at the governments and public where the corporation is 
domiciled, particularly where political, regulatory and lobbying systems are well-
developed. In such circumstances, CSDs will inculcate a sense in local populations 
that their domiciled corporations are much more social responsible than they actually 
are. This alternative anti-managerialist and ‘bottom up’ hypothesis is referred to as the 
‘Maginot’ hypothesis (Glasbeek, 1988, Wolfson and Beck, 2005) as CSDs under 
these circumstances are designed to create a false sense of security amongst the public 
that the corporations are exercising responsibility.  
 The purpose of this paper is to conduct an empirical test of the null ‘benign’ 
hypothesis and the alternative ‘Maginot’ hypothesis. There is currently little evidence 
in favour of either hypothesis or indeed on the relationship between international 
activity and CSD in general. Even so, over recent decades a large literature on the 
determinants of corporate social disclosure (CSD) has evolved. There have been two 
distinct approaches. First there have been economic studies which have explained 
CSD in terms of stock market and accounting metrics. Second, CSD has been related 
to the social context in which firms operate. In these models, the economic 
relationship between the firm’s management and shareholders is extended to include 
social and environmental interests as part of a wider definition of the firm’s 
stakeholders, or as a process of legitimating the firm’s activities in the eyes of society. 
Although each approach has achieved significant results, it is not clear how the 
approaches compare and which of these explanations is the more robust. The first 
objective of this paper is therefore to test the joint effects of economic accountability 
and social context on CSD. 
 A problem with attempting such a synthesis, however, is that the two 
approaches have used differing methodologies. Studies utilising multiple stakeholder 
approaches and especially legitimacy theory tend to be qualitative and case study 
orientated whereas those mapping economic relationships tend to be quantitative. The 
approach adopted in this study is therefore to quantify the social and political 
variables. Whilst this allows us to see the relative performance of these variables 
against economic variables in testable models, a limitation is that it does not provide 
any generalisable test of stakeholder theory or legitimacy theory. 
 Nonetheless the study is important, since it is the first to attempt to quantify 
political and social variables in this fashion. The paper is organised as follows. The 
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next section reviews the prior empirical literature in the two areas referred to above. 
Section three sets out the data and model to test the ‘Benign’ and ‘Maginot’ 
hypotheses. Section four analyses the results. Section five draws conclusions and 
discusses the implications of the support for the ‘Maginot’ hypothesis. 
 
2. Prior studies of the determinants of CSD 
There has been extensive research suggesting that the stock market acts as an 
important source of demand for CSD information. Surveys of financial users have 
tended to conclude that CSD’s are of moderate importance (Belkaoui, 1984; Benjamin 
and Stanga, 1977; Chenall and Juchau, 1977; and Firth, 1978) while other ranking 
studies undertake surveys of potential users to indicate their needs and demands for 
social information (see, Buzby and Falk, 1979; Belkaoui, 1980; Dierkes and Antal, 
1985). These studies find CSD to be of importance to users and in some cases at least 
equally important as financial items of disclosure. In a more recent study (Deegan and 
Rankin, 1997), respondents were asked to consider whether different decisions would 
be made depending on the availability of CSD, finding that environmental disclosures 
are important and material to investors. From an agency theory perspective, as 
shareholders become aware of the effect of social and environmental performance of 
the firms in which they invest, managers will emphasise social and environmental 
performance by disclosing social and environmental information in the annual reports 
(Ness and Mirza, 1991). Milne and Chan’s (1999) findings, however, suggest 
investors largely ignore narrative social disclosure. 
In addition to their mixed empirical results, these studies are often either mis-
specified or under-theorised (Gray et al, 1995a; Tilt and Symes, 1999) and too limited 
in scope. In general they are unable to accommodate structural conflicts of interest 
and inequalities (Tinker et al, 1991). Specifically for the purposes of the current study, 
if the demand for CSD is expressed only as a function of stock market calculation, 
although stock market participants may reflect social and political pressures in their 
valuations, the influence of these wider pressures cannot be quantified or 
differentiated from the underlying financial value of the disclosure. As the scope of 
international activity expands, it is expected that the firm faces greater pressure to 
disclose from a wider range of international financial institutions whose expectations 
may be complementary. At the same time, the political and social pressure for 
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disclosure will potentially increase and these must be differentiated for the purposes 
of empirical testing. 
 Legitimacy theory offers a potential solution to the under-theorisation of the 
economics-based studies. It is founded on the notion of a social contract (Dierkes and 
Antal, 1985; Gray et al., 1995b) and the dimensions of such a contract potentially 
increase as the firm diversifies its activities internationally. Accordingly, CSD is 
sometimes seen as a justification of the organisation’s existence within society 
(Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Guthrie and Parker, 1990; 
Mathews, 1993; Patten, 1992; Shocker and Sethi, 1974; Ullmann, 1976). CSD may 
also be seen as a tool for establishing, protecting or repairing the legitimacy of the 
organisation in that they may influence public opinion and public policy (Patten, 
1991) and reduce political, social and economic exposure and pressure (Deegan and 
Rankin, 1997). Additionally, legitimising by producing CSD may play a part in 
influencing the policy process by shaping social and environmental standards, as 
suggested by Patten (1992, p. 472).  
From the description of these studies, it can be seen that legitimacy theory is 
potentially nested within the benign hypothesis, as managers seek to fulfil their side of 
the social contract. For Lindblom (1994) the purpose is to influence ‘relevant publics’. 
If a multi-national corporation begins to exploit the natural environment of an 
underdeveloped country, it follows that the members of that society become a 
‘relevant public’. However, it seems equally likely that the firm will not seek to 
manage its relationship with this ‘public’ if it has underdeveloped political 
organisation, regulation and lobbying institutions. Some studies have noted the 
selective nature of corporate legitimation and find that in situations of conflicting 
interests, organisations attempt to communicate legitimating characteristics to the 
most important relevant public and to ignore less important public (Neu et al, 1998; 
Oliver, 1991). Acceptance of differential importance provides potential support for 
the Maginot hypothesis, and how ‘most important’ is defined is and measured is very 
important for empirical testing.  
 
3. Hypotheses and data 
Hypotheses 
According to the benign hypothesis, managers feel a sense of social responsibility 
which applies equally to the citizens of the countries in which they conduct their 
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activities. As the company expands its scope of operations, the benign hypothesis 
predicts that the scope of the annual report also expands to accommodate the new 
arrangements of social accountability. If the benign hypothesis is true, CSD will be 
positively related to the number of countries of operation. 
 According to the alternative ‘Maginot’ hypothesis, managers apply CSD 
where they are forced to do so by financial, political and social pressures. They will 
make differential disclosures reflecting inequalities in lobbying power between 
countries and between types of institution. For example where political institutions are 
underdeveloped, managers are less likely to adopt CSD in response to pressures in 
that country. To test the Maginot hypothesis three proxies are developed to measure 
financial, political and social accountability respectively. 
  
Data 
All data is based on year 2000. The sample comprises 87, 22 and 16 companies from 
the global Oil, Chemicals and Transportation industries, respectively. To be included 
a firm had to be international in its scope of operation, defined as operating in two or 
more countries. The sample of oil and gas production companies was obtained from a 
population of 1841 oil and gas production companies (as cited by the Wood 
Mackenzie database). The information available allows the quantification of the 
number of countries where a company has oil and gas reserves and the commercial 
value of these reserves. The sample of 87 oil companies represents 5.54% of the 
population, and covers US$607,982m commercial reserves, or 72.85% of the 
population’s commercial reserves. 
 
Model tested 
The model tested in the paper can be summarised as follows: 
CSD = β0 + β1NOC +β2SMQ + β3CONRISKi + β4ESI + β5FRISK                                   
β6SIZE  +  β7 IND + ε 
                                              
Where,  
CSD = Corporate Social Disclosure; 
β0 = intercept; 
β1 to β7 = Coefficients of slope parameters; 
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NOC = the number of countries of operation for each company 
SMQ = the number of foreign stock market quotations; 
CONRISKi = the unweighted average political risk of the countries in which firm i 
operates expressed as a percentage where 0% = minimum degree of risk and 
100% = maximum risk.  
ESI = the unweighted average environmental sensitivity index (ESI) of the countries 
in which firm i operates expressed as a percentage where 0% = minimum 
degree of sensitivity and 100% = maximum sensitivity.  
FRISK= financial risk measured by the monthly standard deviation of stock returns 
for the year 2000. 
SIZE =  natural logarithm of sales turnover; 
IND = industry classification dummy variable, CHEM = chemical industry firm, OIL 
= Oil industry firm. TRANS = Transport industry which is used as a reference 
group.   
ε = error term. 
 
Dependent variable 
CSD as an empirical variable is defined as all the information produced by corporate 
management in its annual report regarding the interaction between the organisation 
and its physical and social environment, including issues such as those relating to 
human resources, community involvement and the natural environment. This study 
adopts the annual reports as a sole source of CSD data for a number of reasons. First, 
it is a statutory report, which is produced regularly, and one over which management 
exercises editorial control. Second, the annual report is a central corporate document 
which speaks about the organisation as a whole (Gray et al., 2001). Third, it can be 
easily accessed, as they are widely distributed. Fourth, annual reports are regarded as 
important documents in CSD due to the high degree of credibility they lend to 
information reported within them (Tilt, 1994). Fifth, they are used by a number of 
stakeholders as the sole source of certain information (such as environmental 
information (Deegan and Rankin, 1997)). Finally, as suggested by Wiseman (1982, p. 
55) it ‘is widely recognised as the principal means for corporate communications of 
activities and intentions has been the source for virtually all previous corporate 
research.’  
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Content analysis is used to measure CSD as it has been widely adopted in 
previous social responsibility disclosure studies (Hackston and Milne, 1996). To 
facilitate the completion of the content analysis, an interrogation instrument, 
checklist, and decision rules were developed. The sentence was used as the unit of 
coding. Reliability was assessed using two rounds of pre-testing by three coders. The 
two pre-testing rounds produced increasingly convergent views as to what constituted 
a CSR sentence, and led to the formulation of several decision rules and amendments 
to the initial checklist. 
Two measures of CSD were used. CSD is the total number of sentences and 
CSDP is the average number of sentences per page, using an approximation to page 
measurement from the sentence-coded data (after Hackston and Milne, 1996). The 
central assumption underlying the choice of dependent variable is that expanded 
disclosures in the Annual Report are complements rather than substitutes. Therefore 
in the regressions below CSDP is used primarily as a robustness check on the main 
model. 
 
Independent Variables 
Number of countries (NOC) is used as a measure of the degree of multi-nationality 
(extent of multi-national operations) and the MNC’s power and is the principle 
variable used to test the benign hypothesis, where, if true, a positive relationship with 
CSD is expected. Belkaoui (2001) measures the level of multi-nationality by the ratio 
of foreign profits/ total profits and the number of countries in which the company 
operates. Meek et al (1995) measure multi-nationality as a ratio of sales from outside 
the MNC's home country to total sales. For this study, because expansion into a new 
country creates a new social responsibility relation and therefore a potentially new 
accountability relation, number of countries of operation is used and was obtained for 
each company from its annual report. 
The number of stock market quotations (SMQ) is used to examine whether 
financial market pressure contributes a proportionate increase in CSD. This variable is 
used to test whether or not such listings create financial pressures for more disclosure 
over and above the mere scope of international operations suggested by the benign 
hypothesis. A positive relationship between CSD and SMQ would provide support for 
the ‘Maginot’ hypothesis. The number of stock listings for the sampled companies 
was obtained from Datastream. Listings on more than one stock exchange in any 
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given country are counted as one listing for purpose of this study. This is because, the 
stock exchanges in one country usually share the same working environment and thus 
add nothing to the study that aims to investigate the effects of foreign multiple listing. 
Additionally, only those stock listings occurring before April, 2001 are included in the 
study. Hackston and Milne (1996) provide some evidence that dual and multiple 
overseas listings may be associated with greater social disclosure. Cooke (1989, 1992) 
finds an international listing effect on general voluntary accounting disclosures for 
Swedish and Japanese companies, respectively. Gray et al (1993) find the same for 
their sample of U.S., U.K. and Continental European MNCs.  
Country risk (CONRISK) is a proxy for political stability. The study uses the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) risk rating system to assign a numerical 
value (risk points) to a predetermined range of risk components, according to a preset 
weighted scale, for each country covered by the system. Each scale is designed to 
award the highest value to the lowest risk and the lowest value to the highest risk. The 
country risk variable refers to different risk aspects of countries where MNCs operate. 
The country risk measure is used twice in the study as a measure of both the 
countries’ of origin and the countries’ of operation political systems (coded 
[CONRISK(O)] and [CONRISK], respectively). For each sample company the 
average political risk for all the countries in which the firm operates was computed. In 
line with the assumption under the benign hypothesis that social responsibility to new 
publics creates complementary lines of accountability, simple averages were used so 
that each country carries an equal weighting. The total was then subtracted from 
100%, so that firms with operations typically in higher risk countries have higher 
CONRISK scores.  
The Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) is used to proxy for social 
development. A high score indicates a high level of development and associated 
social and environmental regulation. Sandrea (2003) used ESI to proxy for country 
environmental risk. The measure includes different areas such as the environmental 
system (urban air quality, water quantity and quality, land, bio-diversity) in the 
country, environmental stresses (such as air pollution, water pollution/use, ecosystem 
stress, waste/consumption, and population) on the system, human vulnerability and 
public health, the social and institutional capacity (their science/technical capacity, 
rigorous policy debate, environmental regulation and management, tracking 
environmental conditions, and the public choice failures), and the overall country’s 
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global stewardship (its ability to participate in efforts to conserve international 
environmental resources, and its impact on global commons). For each sample 
company the average ESI for all the countries in which the firm operates was 
computed. In similar fashion to the CONRISK variable above, the assumption is that 
under the benign hypothesis social responsibility to new publics creates 
complementary lines of accountability, so again simple averages were used so that 
each country carries an equal weighting. The total was then subtracted from 100%, so 
that firms with operations typically in socially underdeveloped countries have higher 
ESI scores.  
 
Control variables 
Financial risk (FRISK) is included in the study as a control variable. It is assumed that 
if corporate managers engage in CSD in response to widening their scope of 
operations or exposure to political and social risk then financial risk will also form 
part of their risk management strategy. Financial risk is computed as the standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns which was calculated from the share prices for the 
year 2000 that were obtained from the Datastream data base for each of the sampled 
companies over the chosen sample time period sampled companies. 
An association between company size and CSD has been demonstrated in a 
number of empirical studies (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Cowen et al., 1987; Kelly, 
1981; Patten, 1991, 1992; Trotman and Bradley, 1981). Although size appears to be 
the most consistently reported as having a significant association with CSD, not all 
CSD studies have supported a size-disclosure relationship, where, for example, 
Roberts (1992) found no relationship in a US sample. Similarly, in New Zealand, Ng 
(1985) failed to support hypothesised association between company size and CSD 
practices. These inconsistencies might reflect differences in the countries of study or 
even the nature of sampled companies (local, multi-national, or a mix of the two 
types). Corporate size is measured in different ways in the prior CSD literature such 
as by the natural logarithm of book value of total assets (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Inchausti, 1997), by the market value of equity (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993), the natural logarithm of turnover (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; 
Patten, 1991, Roberts, 1992). In this study SIZE is the natural logarithm of the 
turnover, being the most popular measure of corporate size in the past research of 
CSD. 
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A number of studies have examined whether industry sector is able to explain 
CSD; Control for industry membership in the regressions is potentially important. 
Hackston and Milne (1996) report that disclosures are higher in, what they classify as, 
high profile industries while Ness and Mirza (1991) found this relationship holds 
specifically for the oil industry. On the other hand, Cowen et al (1987), Adams et al 
(1995) and Freedman and Jaggi (1988) find that specific areas of disclosure are 
related to industry sector. Cowen et al (1987) find that the industry helps to explain 
energy and community disclosures whilst Adams et al (1995) conclude that the 
industry explains some environmental and some employee disclosures. The sample 
contains companies from three industries, shown under the IND grouping variable. 
They are Chemicals (CHEM), Oil (OIL) and Transport (TRAN). Each is chosen for 
the relative environmental sensitivity of its activities. TRAN is used as a reference 
group so that the differential effects of CHEM and OIL can be assessed in the 
analysis.  
 
4. Analysis 
Descriptive statistics 
Summary descriptive statistics are shown in table 1. Preliminary exploration of the 
data revealed a number of problems. As the dependent variable was a count measure, 
the most important issue was model specification. As is typical of such data the 
standard deviation was high relative to the mean. However all companies in the 
sample made some disclosure and there was no limit on the right hand side of the 
distribution. Therefore the dependent variable was transformed into a categorical 
variable CSD1 taking a value of 1 if CSD>0 & CSD<=20, 2 if CSD>20 & 
CSD<=39…5 if CSD >80. The effect of this transformation was to reduce the 
standard deviation in relation to the mean (Table 1, panel A). For the same reasons a 
similar transformation was applied to CSDP, using cut points at CSDP>0, 1, 2, 3, and 
4> to create a new categorical variable CSDP1. As can be seen from table 1, the effect 
of these transformations was to reduce the standard deviation relative to the mean. To 
accommodate the categorical dependent variable, ordered probit specification was 
used.  
Table 1 about here 
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 A second problem was the influence of outlying observations in the regression 
residuals in tests of the full model. Royal Dutch Shell had a particularly 
disproportionate influence and was removed from subsequent regressions in which the 
sample size is reported as 124. Cook-Weisberg tests indicated the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the residuals, so robust standard errors were used in all models 
tested (White, 1980). Finally, as can be seen from table 1 panel B there was 
significant cross correlation between several of the independent variables. The 
CONRISK and ESI variables both measure the general level of development to some 
extent and therefore some correlation is to be expected. Multi co-linearity was dealt 
with by sequential variable omission and by using stepwise model building. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Discussion of Results 
Table 2 panel a) reports the results of six models using CSD1 as the dependent 
variable. NOC was insignificant in all models tested, including model 1a which offers 
a specific test of the benign hypothesis. Although NOC always has a positive co-
efficient, there is no evidence that as the firm diversifies its operations, managers feel 
any obligation to open up new lines of reporting and accountability to the public in 
the affected countries. Model 2a adds the SMQ variable which is highly significant in 
this and all subsequent models tested. Looking at the results in models 1a-6a inclusive 
it can be seen that the SMQ variable dominates the NOC variable. International 
diversification of financial accountability therefore dominates the diversification of 
operating activity as a determinant of CSD. Also the marginal effects are much 
greater. On average the firms were operating in 18 different countries but had only 2 
stock market quotations. Marginal effects analysis shows that an additional stock 
market quotation increases CSD by around 25%.  
 The introduction of CONRISK and ESI variables into the analytical models 
illustrated their differential effects.1 CONRISK had a higher co-efficient in all models 
in which it was tested compared to CONRISK(O). In contrast ESI(O) had a higher co-
efficient and was more significant than ESI in all models. In all models CONRISK 
                                                          
1 On average a sample company’s international activities increased its exposure to 
political risk by 46% and to less developed countries by 43% (based on the ratios of 
CONRISK/CONRISK(O) and ESI/ESI(O) respectively in table 1. 
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(including CONRISK(O)) and ESI (including ESI(O)) variables have positive and 
negative signs respectively. As expected, exposure to political risk increases CSD 
whilst relative social underdevelopment reduces it. Model 3a summarises the main 
result from tests using permutations of these variables. Models 4 and 5 show the 
differential impacts of ESI and ESI(O), confirming the latter variable to be more 
influential. These results suggest that political risk in the destination country and 
social development in the home country condition the level of CSD. Because CSD is 
explained more strongly by the level of social development in the multi-nationals own 
country, rather than in the country of operation, the benign hypothesis is rejected. 
Managers do not provide equal accountability to the people of the different countries 
in which they operate. Managers seem to be giving precedence to publics that can 
exert more influence on them and but they feel nonetheless obliged to respond to the 
increased political risk overseas through increased CSD. These results provide 
support for the ‘Maginot’ hypothesis. 
Model 6 reports a stepwise forward selection model using a 0.2 significance 
level for variable addition. The model confirms the positive relationship between CSD 
and the two CONRISK variables and the negative relationship with the two ESI 
variables. In view of the high correlation between CONRISK and ESI and 
CONRISK(O) and ESI(O) respectively (table 1), the co-efficients for individual 
variables must be treated with caution. 
Dealing with the control variables in turn, FRISK had a consistently high and 
negatively significant co-efficient. The volatility of the firm’s stock therefore seems to 
act as a strong constraint on CSD. There may be two reasons for this. First, where 
firms have a high level of combined operating and financial risk, they may be 
reluctant to disclose further details in case the market’s perception of the riskiness of 
their activities increases further. Second, the volatility of their stock price may reflect 
their relatively narrow range of international activities which in itself reduces the 
necessity for disclosure. The interpretation of this variable is not central to the main 
objectives of the current paper, but in view of these findings is nonetheless a subject 
of potential further research. The industry control variables showed that whereas oil 
and transport firms were indistinguishable from one another, firms in the chemical 
industry make significantly more CSD. Finally the SIZE variable was positive and 
significant in all models tested showing strong support for the common finding of a 
strong relationship between size of firm and CSD. 
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Panel b of table 2 shows the results of similar models using CSDP as the 
dependent variable. Models 1b, 2b and 3b correspond exactly to the same numbered 
models in Panel A. Also, as in Panel A, model 9 reports the results of a stepwise 
forward selection model using a 0.2 significance level for variable addition. The 
results for models 1 and 2 respectively were very similar. Using the alternative 
dependent variable the result for NOC remains the same. In model 3b neither 
CONRISK nor ESI(O) were significant, in contrast to model 3a. In other words these 
factors promote an increase in absolute quantity of disclosure (model 3a) but not an 
increase in the prominence of CSD as a reported issue relative to other disclosures 
(model 3b). A possible reason is that because disclosures are being made primarily for 
the consumption of stock market participants and the domestic audience, managers 
consider the quantity of information to be sufficient, but do not privilege CSD at the 
expense of other disclosures. As models 7 and 8 in Panel B suggest, they are more 
likely to do this where CONRISK(O) is high. Again in these models ESI(O) has a 
larger co-efficient and is more significant than ESI, suggesting support for the 
‘Maginot’ hypothesis consistent with the panel A results. Results for control variables 
are similar to panel A.  
 
Conclusions 
The benign hypothesis, which assumes corporate control by enlightened oligarchs of 
managers, who apply similar standards of social accountability to different groups of 
people across the globe, is rejected. The alternative ‘Maginot’ hypothesis is favoured 
by the evidence presented above. According to this hypothesis, the domestic public is 
comforted by the presence of impressively detailed CSDs in annual reports but is in 
ignorance of the true threat presented by corporate activities internationally. 
Meanwhile in countries where environmental protection is weak, local populations are 
all too well aware of the impacts of corporate activity but lack the defence 
mechanisms offered by CSD in more developed countries. As the survey results show, 
whatever the conscience of an individual manager, collectively they are motivated by 
the need to satisfy the requirements of stock market participants first, their domestic 
public second and the people affected by their international activities last. To the 
investor in the developed world, this ‘Maginot’ of CSD offers scant protection from 
the changes in material conditions that necessarily follow from the exploitation of the 
world’s resources by oil companies and others, and like the French generals of 1940 
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will find that whilst paying attention to their neat line of forts, the enemy was taking 
their capital. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Variable descriptives 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Swilk      
CSD 64.544   61.356  1 258 0.000      
CSDP 3.093 2.976 0.040 12.320 0.000      
CSD1 2.838 1.732 1 5 0.033      
CSDP1 2.862 1.579 1 5 0.272      
ESI 50.568 9.937 25.570 77.260 0.808      
ESI_O 35.295 9.370 19.530 62.440 0.000      
CONRISK 28.119 6.022 17.1 45.58 0.083      
CONRISK_O 19.261 6.965 9.500 52.500 0.000      
CHEM 0.185 0.390 0 1       
OIL 0.685 0.466 0 1       
SIZE 6.433 1.051 3.580 8.380 0.000      
FRISK 0.120 0.050 0.020 0.300 0.000      
NOC 17.855 22.541 2 150 0.000      
SMQ 2.298 1.385 1 9 0.000      
            
Panel B: 
Correlations            
 CSD1 CONRISK CONRIS~O ESI ESI_O CHEM OIL SIZE FRISK NOC SMQ 
CSD1 1.000 0.215 -0.103 0.105 -0.068   0.466    
CONRISK  1.000 0.254 0.618 0.147   0.125    
CONRISK_O  1.000 0.324 0.627   -0.024    
ESI   0.345 1.000 0.474   0.258    
ESI_O   0.528 0.493 1.000   0.200    
CHEM 0.294 -0.064 -0.112 0.185 0.179 1.000      
OIL -0.193 0.192 0.190 -0.078 -0.224 -0.705 1.000     
SIZE      0.153 -0.210 1.000    
FRISK -0.461 -0.115 0.114 -0.047 0.021 -0.081 0.117 -0.371 1.000   
NOC 0.385 0.420 0.123 0.435 0.246 0.225 -0.228 0.578 -0.364 1.000  
SMQ 0.361 0.158 -0.018 0.144 0.009 0.264 -0.185 0.231 -0.259 0.280 1.000
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Regression models 
 
 
Panel a) Dependent variable = CSD1 
 
 Model  
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4) (5) (6) 
NOC 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004  
SMQ  0.282*** 0.256*** 0.262*** 0.279*** 0.251*** 
CONRISK   0.033**   0.061*** 
CONRISK (O)      0.032** 
ESI     -0.016* -0.033** 
ESI(O)   -0.027** -0.023**  -0.029** 
FRISK -7.620*** -6.955*** -6.679*** -6.643*** -6.992*** -7.846*** 
CHEM 0.934** 0.742** 0.770** 0.812** 0.871** 0.943** 
OIL 0.368 0.278 0.117 0.276 0.364  
SIZE 0.516*** 0.486*** 0.521*** 0.523*** 0.520*** 0.597*** 
       
       
Psuedo R2 0.154 0.179 0.199 0.190 0.185 0.216 
Chi Sq 58.290 83.620 75.420 76.880 81.430 97.350 
N 124 124 124 124 124 124 
 
 
Panel b) Dependent variable = CSDP1 
 
 Model 
 (1b) (2b) (3b) (7) (8) (9) 
NOC 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005  
SMQ  0.279*** 0.268*** 0.254*** 0.278*** 0.262*** 
CONRISK   0.005    
CONRISK_O    0.046*** 0.026** 0.049*** 
ESI     -0.018*  
ESI_O  -0.010 -0.033**  -0.035** 
FRISK -5.543*** -4.681** -4.428** -5.531** -5.653** -5.941*** 
CHEM 0.969*** 0.745** 0.759** 0.884** 0.929** 0.637*** 
OIL 0.493 0.415 0.387 0.302 0.464*  
SIZE 0.501*** 0.476*** 0.491*** 0.537*** 0.524*** 0.548*** 
       
       
Psuedo R2 0.133 0.158 0.161 0.174 0.168 0.171 
Chi Sq 56.010 81.320 79.830 85.910 83.690 79.770 
N 124 124 124 124 124 124 
 
Significance levels  
*** p < .01 
** p < .05 
* p < .10 
 
Based on White’s (1980) heteroscedastic consistent standard errors. 
 
